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Discursive Disparities
Nancy Leong

∗

ABSTRACT
Both within and beyond the legal profession, men write more
than women. Men publish more books; the books men write are reviewed more often in the most widely read forums; men write more of
the reviews; men dominate the opinion pages of major news outlets;
men write more of the articles in the most widely read magazines; and
more men blog on the most widely read websites. Even on Wikipedia—widely hailed as a cyber-utopia open to anyone—more than 85%
of entries are primarily authored by men. This is true also in the legal
realm. Men write more judicial opinions. Men author more legislation. Men write more briefs—both for parties and as amici—before
the Supreme Court. Men write more law review articles, and their
articles are published in more prominent journals. Indeed, the disparity in legal scholarship begins in law school, where men publish a disproportionate percentage of student notes.
This Essay begins by suggesting several explanations for the gender disparity in the amount of discursive space men and women occupy. It then examines the consequences of that disparity. It first emphasizes the harms to women that the disparity causes, with an emphasis on the legal profession. Such harms include economic loss,
damage to career, and diminished public influence. These harms are
serious in themselves. Perhaps more importantly, however, the discursive gender disparity means that men’s words dominate public discourse, and to control discourse is to control reality. When men’s
words, thoughts, ideas, and arguments constitute the overriding public
narrative, the result is that men determine the texture of daily life on
matters both trivial and grave. The result of the discursive disparity is
that male discourse exercises a disproportionate influence on our collective consciousness.
∗
Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Many thanks to Rebecca Aviel, Charlotte Garden, Justin Pidot, and Joyce Sterling for the conversations that helped
to shape this Essay. My gratitude to Kerri Stone and the members of the FIU Law Review for
putting together an outstanding symposium.
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The Essay concludes with preliminary suggestions for interventions to ameliorate the discursive disparity.
I. INTRODUCTION
“What knowledge have we of anything, save through our own
minds? All happenings are in the mind. Whatever happens in all
1
minds, truly happens.”
Men dominate our public discourse. They disproportionately occupy our forums of communication, including books, news sources,
magazines, and blogs. The same is true within the legal realm, where
men write far more judicial opinions, appellate briefs and other legal
documents, scholarly publications, and legal commentary.
But should we care?
This Essay answers that question in the affirmative, arguing that
the gender disparity in discursive participation harms women. Concretely, the disparity has negative consequences for women’s lives,
careers, and personal well-being. More broadly, the disparity distorts
our discourse by conforming that discourse to male perspectives.
Language, I will explain, constructs reality. And when men dominate
forums of communication, their linguistic dominance translates to a
disproportionate influence on the perceived nature of the world we
live in.
I wish to make one important matter clear at the outset. This Es2
say is avowedly anti-essentialist. I do not attribute any particular perspective to men, nor to women. Rather, my point is that men and
women have different experiences with society as a direct result of
their respective genders; that over time those different experiences
lead, in the aggregate, to some differences in perspectives and opinions; and that across the realm of discourse, a disproportionate number of male contributors means that the discourse will differ in tangible ways.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the discursive
gender disparity as an empirical matter, cataloging the many forums
currently dominated by men. Part II examines the consequences of
the discursive disparity, first as a theoretical matter, and then within
the specific context of the law and legal discourse. Part III considers
ways of adjusting discourse—both legal and cultural—as a means of
mending gender inequity.
1

GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 248 (1949).
See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581 (1990).
2
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II. THE DISCURSIVE DISPARITY
This Part traces the gap between the amount of discursive space
that men occupy and the amount of discursive space that women occupy. I begin with a brief survey of discourse generally, and then focus
on the disparity within the law and legal context.
A. In the World
The relationship between gender and authorship has made the
news recently. Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, no one has examined
that relationship systemically—that is, most studies and articles have
reported on a single forum in which women are underrepresented
rather than the underrepresentation of women in most forums in
3
which people write.
With that said, it is worth a brief overview of the studies and reports cataloging the scarcity of women as authors in a range of forums.
4
Women author fewer articles in general print news sources. Women
5
author fewer columns in widely-read opinion forums. Women author
6
fewer novels reviewed in the most well-known book reviews. There
are fewer women bloggers, and the most well-known bloggers are
7
primarily men. Some influential blogs remain entirely male in their
8
permanent authorship. Even on Wikipedia, widely hailed as a cyberutopia readily accessible by anyone, women author only thirteen per9
cent of entries.
We are so accustomed to this discursive disparity that, for the
most part, we do not notice it. We do not think about the fact that the
only two women on the New York Times’ opinion page are Maureen
Dowd and Gail Collins; it is simply a fact. The Modern Library Association announces a list of the “100 Best Books” that includes only
3
See infra notes 4-10 (listing examples describing forums in which women are underrepresented).
4
Amy King, The Count 2010, VIDA, http://vidaweb.org/the-count-2010 (last visited Oct.
12, 2011).
5
See, e.g., James Rainey, A Very Public Opinion Exchange, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2005),
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/mar/11/entertainment/et-estrich11; Dahlia Lithwick, Girl Fight,
SLATE (Mar. 16, 2005, 5:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2114926/.
6
Laura Miller, Literature’s Gender Gap, SALON (Feb. 9, 2011, 7:01 AM),
http://www.salon.com/books/laura_miller/2011/02/09/women_literary_publishing.
7
Kara Jesella, Blogging’s Glass Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/fashion/27blogher.html (explaining that while fourteen percent of men blog, as compared to eleven percent of women, the most well-known bloggers according to recent rankings by Techcult and Forbes are almost entirely men).
8
See, e.g., THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://www.volokh.com. As of February 8, 2013, all
twenty-one of the blog’s contributors were men.
9
Noam Coan, Define Gender Gap? Look up Wikipedia’s Contributor List, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/31/business/media/31link.html.
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10

eight books by women —a list that is distributed in high school classrooms across the English-speaking world—and there is little protest in
11
response. The gender disparity in discourse is taken as a given—
simply something that is real about the world.
The discursive disparity is so prevalent that it permeates areas
where we do not even recognize it. I could offer many examples, but
given the brevity of this essay, consider just one. Even our naming
conventions divest women of discursive space. A presumption remains that women should change their last names upon marriage to a
man—indeed, a 2009 study found that 70% of Americans believe this
12
should be legally required. To be clear, I am not at all opposed to a
woman making that choice. I think that everyone ought to do with
their names what they wish—both men and women, and both after
13
marriage and otherwise. But there are many stories of women pressured into the choice by their husbands or families. A name is often in
14
itself a communicative act —and usurping control of another’s name
15
is a method of silencing.
My hope is that this admittedly brief survey of the gender disparity in various forms of discourse and communication is sufficient to
persuade the reader that it exists in the world generally. I next turn to
the specific realm of the law.
B.

In the Law

The discursive gender disparity extends to the realm of law and
legal discourse. We often hear that women are now half of all law stu16
dents, but a gross disparity remains within most segments of the pro10 Modern Library’s 100 Best Novels, MODERN LIBRARY, http://www.modernlibrary.
com/top-100/100-best-novels/ (last updated 2013).
11 Certainly some commentators noted the homogeneity of the list, but googling the list
brings up very few criticisms. Rather, we find blog posts by bibliophiles pledging to read the
entire list, or teachers debating which selections are appropriate for their classes.
12 Jillian Berman, 70% Say Brides Should Take Husband’s Name, USA TODAY, (Aug. 11,
2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-08-11-change-name_N.htm?csp=34.
13 Nancy Leong, What’s in a Name? For Married Women, a Lifetime of Effort, FEMINIST
LAW PROFESSORS BLOG (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2011/01/whatsmarried-women-lot-work/.
14 Consider, for example, people who change their names—the new name often communicates something about the person’s place in the world. Jessica Steinhauser, for example, gained
fame, success, and wealth in the porn industry only after she changed her name to Asia Carrera,
thereby invoking stereotypes of Asian female sexuality for profit.
15 For example, women with ethnically-identified last names sometimes speak of their
sense of identity loss upon changing their name to match that of a husband of another race.
16 This does not appear to be true for women who attend the top fifty schools, as ranked by
U.S. News and World Report. Research spanning 1999-2009 found that women comprised only
47% of the student body at these schools. Jennifer Mullins & Nancy Leong, The Persistent Gender Disparity in Student Note Publication, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 385, 392-93 (2011).
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fession. It exists within the judiciary: only three of the nine Supreme
Court justices are women; 51 of 162 federal appellate judges are
women, or about 31%; and approximately 30% of federal district
17
court judges are women. This means, of course, that only about a
third of judicial opinions are by women—that is, are direct contributions by women to judicial discourse.
The disparity is likewise present in litigation. Women author
18
fewer merits briefs before the Supreme Court. They are only 15% of
19
the partners at big law firms, who contribute to external legal discourse through representation and litigation, and to internal legal dis20
course by shaping the culture of the firm.
Disparities also permeate legal education. Only 37.3% of ten21
ured and tenure-track professors are women. But this disparity
grows even greater when we examine the written work that originates
from the legal academy: only 32% of law review articles are by
women, and the disparity is even more significant at the “most prestigious” law reviews, with women publishing 20.4% of articles in those
22
venues. The same disparity troubles student note publication: my
previous study of every student note published over ten years at the
“top fifty” law schools found that women published only about a third
23
of the student notes in question. Other research has found that
women participate less frequently in class, making the aural experi24
ence of law school one sounding primarily in male voices. And the
17 Women in the Federal Judiciary: Still a Long Way to Go, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CENTER
(Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/women-federal-judiciary-still-long-way-go-1; see
also Federal Bench Gender Snapshot, THE THIRD BRANCH, http://www.uscourts.gov/
News/TheThirdBranch/10-10-01/Federal_Bench_Gender_Snapshot.asp
x (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
18 Tammy A. Sarver, Erin B. Kaheny & John J. Szmer, The Attorney Gender Gap in U.S.
Supreme Court Litigation, 91 JUDICATURE 238, 242 (2008) (finding that from 1993-2001 women
were only 25.52% of attorneys listed on Supreme Court merits briefs, and that women argued
only 13.91% of Supreme Court cases).
19 BARBARA M. FLOM, REPORT OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL NAWL NATIONAL SURVEY ON
RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 3 (Oct. 2012), available at
http://nawl.timberlakepublishing.com/files/NAWL%202012%20Survey%20Report%20final.pdf.
20 Eli Wald, Glass-ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and
the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2247-49 (2010).
21 2008-2009 AALS Statistical Report on Law Faculty, ASS’N OF AM. L. SCH., available at
http://www.aals.org/statistics/2009dlt/gender.html.
22 See Minna Kotkin, Of Authorship and Audacity: An Empirical Study of Gender Disparity
and Privilege in the ‘Top Ten’ Law Reviews, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 385, 398 & fig. 4 (2010).
23 Mullins & Leong, supra note 16, at 398.
24 Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine & Jane Balin, Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at
One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 45–47 (1994) (finding that women felt more
alienated than men by the Socratic method and were consequently less likely than men to speak
in class, and finding that this silence contributed to women’s alienation from the law school
experience); Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and Centrifugal
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materials—at least during the first year curriculum—tend to consist
25
almost exclusively of writings by men. For example, most seminal
judicial opinions are by men—unsurprisingly, since there have only
been four women Supreme Court Justices in history, and the first was
26
not appointed until 1981. Collectively, these various factors combine
to make law school a place that—while not wholly exclusive of female
27
perspectives—is nonetheless dominated by male discourse.
III. CONSTRUCTING REALITY
Language constructs reality. We know this intuitively and recognize it when we see it. George Orwell’s 1984 famously communicated
28
the idea that whoever controls language controls reality. The oppressive government in that novel asserted the power to command that
2+2=5—the ability to instill belief in what is patently false reveals the
29
ultimate ability to control reality. As the protagonist Winston is told
during one torture session: “There are three stages in your reintegration. . . . [t]here is learning, there is understanding, and there is accep30
tance” of the Party’s assertion of what is true.
If language constructs reality, then those who control the discourse also control what is real. It follows that when discourse is disproportionally male, that male perspective constructs our perceptions
of reality. This Part explores this insight, first as a theoretical matter,
then within the realm of the law.

Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy, and Discourse, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 847, 879–85
(2000) (describing women’s experiences with classroom silencing); Adam Neufeld, Costs of an
Outdated Pedagogy? Study on Gender at Harvard Law School, 13 AM. U. J.GENDER, SOC. POL’Y
& L. 511, 522 (2005) (examining legal education at Harvard Law School); Claire G. Schwab, A
Shifting Gender Divide: The Impact of Gender on Education at Columbia Law School in the New
Millennium, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 299, 318 (2003) (examining legal education at Columbia Law School); Sari Bashi & Maryana Iskander, Why Legal Education Is Failing Women, 18
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 389, 403-17 (2006).
25 Given that most first year casebooks focus on the “seminal” cases in traditional doctrinal
subjects, and that most of the seminal cases were decided before 1981, these cases are by and
large authored by men.
26 That Justice was Sandra Day O’Connor; she has since been followed by Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.
27 Of course, this varies a great deal from one institution to the next. For example, in my
longitudinal examination of student note publication, some law reviews showed massive disparities in the number of notes published by women and by men, while others showed no disparity at
all. Mullins & Leong, supra note 16. Likewise, some schools have nearly equal numbers of men
and women on faculty, while others display a marked disparity.
28 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 259 (1949).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 216.
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A. Performance Through Language
The philosopher of language, J.L. Austin, introduced the idea of
“performative utterances”—that is, statements that do not merely describe facts about the world, but that when uttered under certain cir31
cumstances are tantamount to performing a certain kind of action.
For example: “I now pronounce you husband and wife.” The words
are not merely descriptive of the world; when uttered at a wedding
ceremony, they actually create change.
Closer to home, consider the following phrase in a judicial opin32
ion: “Counsel for the defendant did not raise the argument.” The
phrase is more than merely descriptive. It is critical: counsel should
have raised the argument. It is performative: because counsel did not
raise the argument, the court will not consider it. And, of course, it is
predictive: because counsel did not raise the argument, the defendant
will not prevail upon it. Taken in context, then, this simple declarative
sentence embodies far more about the world than the raw meaning of
its individual words.
The gender disparity in discourse thus has significance beyond
the actual words and statements that men disproportionately communicate.
B.

Legal Realities

What are the consequences of the discursive disparity? Certainly
there are tangible consequences for women’s lives and careers. A
woman excluded from legal academia cannot make her opinions
heard by courts, commentators, advocates, and fellow academics. A
woman who is driven away from blogging by cyber harassment loses
the visibility and exposure to her career that a robust online presence
generates.
In the aggregate, these harms are concrete. Women’s careers may
stagnate; they may suffer economic loss over a lifetime; they may
never have the same opportunity for public influence as their male
counterparts; they may find themselves unhappy in their legal careers;
they may leave the legal realm altogether. These consequences are
easy to see.

31

See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 1975).
I do not detail here Austin’s complex and fascinating theory of “illocutionary acts,” as
distinct from other kinds of speech acts, or the notion of an “illocutionary force.” The basic
notion that speech may be constitutive rather than merely descriptive will suffice for present
purposes.
32
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But there are also consequences beyond the fates of individual
33
women, or even women as a group. The disparities I discussed in
Part I(B) unsurprisingly add up to a collective acknowledgment that
men’s views are more audible, more pervasive, and more influential
than women’s. For example, a poll run by Legal Affairs included only
three women in a list of the twenty most influential legal thinkers, and
34
the seven legal scholars on the list were all men. The result is that
men disproportionately control legal discourse, and, hence, legal realities and legal outcomes. Moreover, the law touches every aspect of
daily life—by its absence as well as its presence. Thus, when men’s
words, thoughts, ideas, and arguments constitute the overriding public
narrative, the result is that men determine the texture of daily life on
matters both grave and trivial.
Let me offer a few more concrete examples. Women who do not
author briefs do not have the opportunity to persuade courts of their
35
perspectives. Women who do not write articles—who were often
women who did not write student notes—do not become law professors, and thus lose the opportunity to influence courts, commentators,
students, and fellow academics with their ideas. Women who do not
blog lose the opportunity to reach, influence, and persuade a broad,
generalist audience with their opinions and insights. Women who
leave the practice of law after a few years of frustration and disappointment do not become law firm partners, leaders in the public interest world, or members of the state and federal judiciaries, and thus
lose the platform that these prestigious positions would provide.
The net effect is that the discursive disparity I have described results in a suppression of women’s ideas and views. Of course, I do not
claim that such views are altogether suppressed. But I worry that they
are drowned out, or given insufficient time, in a discursive world that
is numerically dominated by men.
IV. DIMINISHING THE DISPARITY
The discursive disparity within the legal profession could be lessened in two ways: women could write more, or men could write less. I
33 Of course, I do not mean to trivialize these individual and group harms. I do, however,
want to call attention to a consequence that I think is vastly under-discussed—the harm to discourse itself.
34 Who
Are the Top 20 Legal Thinkers in America?, LEGAL AFFAIRS,
http://www.legalaffairs.org/poll/ (last visited May 29, 2013).
35 As I noted in the Introduction, I am not suggesting that women have a single unitary
perspective on any issue. My point is that men and women have different experiences with
society as a direct result of their respective gender; that over time those different experiences
lead, in the aggregate, to different perspectives; and that over the course of many legal briefs we
would expect these different perspectives to yield different arguments.
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am more inclined to the former approach and will focus on that approach here, while adding a couple of thoughts about the latter at the
end.
As to how we could inspire more participation in discourse by
women, we might do so in two ways. One suite of interventions would
remove barriers to entering the discourse for women. The other
would create incentives for women to enter existing discourses, perhaps in spite of those barriers.
As to the former, legal mechanisms may help us. We ought to
consider carefully the various obstacles that prevent women from
achieving equal voice within the profession. This might require a
more expansive notion of what constitutes discrimination within the
workplace and its long-term consequences on women’s lives. A
woman who has experienced sexual harassment at a law firm, for ex36
ample, is unlikely to linger long enough to make partner. Many of
my colleagues have proposed what I see as sensible amendments to
37
current workplace law governing gender discrimination. In my view,
we ought to include discursive impediments as one consequence of
sexual harassment and hostile work environments, both in constructing the substantive doctrine itself and in considering appropriate
damages and other remedies.
Likewise, a range of scholars have examined the phenomenon of
cyber harassment and the way that it excludes women from the world
38
of online discourse. Scholars have proposed ways of regulating cy39
berspace to make it safe for women to speak in online forums. While
my project here is not to weigh in on the merits of the various proposals, surely one way to balance online discourse is to deploy tort and
criminal law to improve the safety of online environments for women
who wish to share their ideas there.
A cultural, rather than legal, shift to online civility will also lessen
the discursive disparity. Recent commentary has wondered why we
40
are so impolite to one another online. Beyond legal interventions,
websites could voluntarily adopt civility codes as a condition of par36 See, e.g., Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy J. Reichman, So, You Want to be a Lawyer? The Quest
for Professional Status in a Changing Legal World, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289 (2010).
37 Such scholarship is voluminous; I list only a small sample here. See, e.g., Susan Grover &
Kimberley Piro, Consider the Source: When the Harasser is the Boss, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 499
(2010); Kerri Stone, Why Women Who Submit to Supervisory Sexual Harassment are Faring
Better in Court Than Those Who Say No . . . And Why They Shouldn’t, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM
25 (2008).
38 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009).
39 Id.
40 Elizabeth Bernstein, Why We Are So Rude Online, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592404578030351784405148.html.
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ticipation. This would not make cyberspace as a whole safe for
women. But it would create safe environments—perhaps many safe
environments—where women’s views could be heard.
The latter mechanism—reducing the discursive disparity by facilitating participation by women—is more difficult because it is more
difficult to envision how the law might intervene. That is, one cannot
legally require women to write more. An interesting thought experiment involves statutorily requiring a certain level of gender diversity
in written content by all publications with a minimum level of circulation. Of course, the First Amendment challenges would likely render
such a regime legally untenable. But nothing would prevent publications from voluntarily adopting what cannot be required by statute.
Finally, I wonder whether one way of increasing participation in
discourse might be discourse itself. Awareness is sometimes enough to
produce positive change. Admittedly, my evidence is only anecdotal,
but as I have presented my work on the gender disparity in student
note publication before various law reviews, several young women
have told me that as a result of the presentation they felt increased
motivation to produce publishable scholarship during their legal career. Perhaps the simple act of paying more attention to the disparity
might lead to its diminishment.
V. CONCLUSION
The full participation of women in the discourse that constructs
our lives and our realities is a prerequisite for true substantive equality between men and women. I hope that our lifetimes will see the
dissipation of the gender disparity in discourse. I believe that talking
about that disparity—as we have done at this symposium—is the first
step.

